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NOTES
KONANTZ, KOESTER, McCROSSAN, AND TITLE TO
TORRENS PROPERTY
Before 1969, no apparent reason existed to question the conclusivity of
title to Torrens property. Since 1969, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has decided three cases which threaten the conclusivity of Torrens
titles. The greatest threat occurs when a person having a property
interest is denied due process during the Torrens registration proceed-
ing. This Note discusses these three cases and sets forth a proposal
which enhances the stability of Torrens titles while affording an ade-
quate remedy to a person denied due process.
I. IN TRODUCTION .... . ........ ........... ...... 60
II. THE RECENTLY CREATED EXCEPTIONS TO THE INDE-
FEASIBILITY OF TORRENS TITLE ARISING OUT OF STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION -THE Koester AND McCrossan
C A S E S ....................... ...... .......... 6 2
A. The Koester Exception .......... ...... 63
B. The McCrossan Exception ...... ............. 68
C. Reconciliation of Koester and McCrossan with the
T orren s A ct .......... .................. .... 70
III. THE DUE PROCESS EXCEPTION TO' THE FINALITY OF
TORRENS TITLE- THE Konantz AND Koester CASES 73
A. The Due Process Requirements of Konantz ...... 73
B. The Due Process Requirements of Koester ....... 75
IV. A PROPOSED THEORY: COMBINING DUE PROCESS WITH
THE COURT'S STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS TO COMPEN-
SATE EQUITABLY FOR LOSS ............ ........... 81
A. Remedying the Denial of Due Process when the
Adverse Claimant was in Possession or had Notice
of His Interest Filed at the Tine the Registered
Owner Acquired His Registered Interest ........ 83
B. Remedying the Denial of Due Process when the
Adverse Claimant was Neither in Possession Nor
had Notice of His Interest Filed at the Time the
Registered Owner Acquired His Registered Interest
1. The Statutory Requirements for Recovery from 84
the Assurance Fund .................... 86
2. The Statute of Limitatious on Actions Against
th e F u nd ...... ... ............... ..... .. 8 8
3. The Adequacy of Money Damages .......... 89
V. CONCLUSION ...... 90
1
et al.: Konantz, Koester, McCrossan, and Title to Torrens Property
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that attorneys routinely advise their clients to
proceed with certainty and confidence in transactions involving regis-
tered land.' Even among the public the term "Torrens title" rings a
familiar and reassuring note because conclusivity and indefeasibility of
title is the purpose, object, and "capstone" of the Torrens registration
system.! Under the Torrens Act,3 unlike the recording act,' the actual
title, not merely evidence of title, is registered and memorialized in the
certificate of title. 5 Thus, theoretically, a purchaser is not left at his peril
to draw the right conclusion regarding the state of title from evidence
thereof, as with abstract property.' Indefeasible title 7 free from all unre-
gistered claims and rights, with certain limited exceptions,, is the pur-
l. During the trial of Estate of Koester v. Hale, 297 Minn. 387, 211 N.W.2d 778 (1973),
the following dialogue took place:
Q. . . . Now, Mrs. Hale, what transpired at the closing after. . . the deed was
handed to you?
A. Well, I held the deed or the Certificate of Title in my hand and I asked him
where was the Torrens Title, because I had at some point requested or felt that
I was to have-that he was to have searched the title. And I was quite unhappy
because this search had not been made, but he told me that I needn't be that
concerned because what I held in my hand was my guarantee that the property
was mine.
Q. Now, wasn't it a fact that you did not press the title examination issue
because when your Certificate of Title was handed to you Mr. Lampe said you
owned everything in that Certificate?
A. Yes, sir. I would say that it was the main reason I left his office without
pressing him further.
Appellants' Brief at 11-12.
2. See Moore v. Henricksen, 282 Minn. 509, 520, 165 N.W.2d 209, 217 (1968) (quoting
Murphy v. Borgen, 148 Minn. 375, 377, 182 N.W. 449, 450 (1921)); Kane v. State, 237
Minn. 261, 268-69, 55 N.W.2d 333, 337-38 (1952) (quoting In re Juran, 178 Minn. 55, 58,
226 N.W. 201, 202 (1929) and 3 R. DEVLIN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPEITY AND DEEDS § 1439
(3d ed. 1911)); Reed v. Siddall, 89 Minn. 417, 420, 95 N.W. 303, 303-04 (1903) (citing State
ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N.W. 175 (1902)).
3. MINN. STAT. ch. 508 (1976), as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21, 1977 Minn.
Laws 43.
4. MINN. STAT. ch. 507 (1976).
5. E.g., Rea v. Kelley, 183 Minn. 194, 201, 235 N.W. 910, 913 (1931); 6 R. PowELL, THE
LAw OF REAL PaoPERrv 920, at 303 (1977).
6. See, e.g., State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 438, 89 N.W. 175, 175
(1902); 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 920, at 303 (1977).
7. See Nitkey v. S.T. McKnight Co., 87 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S.
697 (1937); In re Juran, 178 Minn. 55, 58, 226 N.W. 201, 202 (1929); Riley v. Pearson, 120
Minn. 210, 223, 139 N.W. 361, 366 (1913); MINN. STAT. §§ 508.22, .25 (1976).
8. Certain statutory exceptions to the finality of a decree are part of the Torrens system.
See MINN. STAT. § 508.25 (1976). Thus, the first registered owner and each subsequent
bona fide purchaser holds a certificate of title free from all unmemorialized encumbrances
and adverse claims, except:
[Vol. 4
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ported result of a decree for registration and certificate of title. As of
1968, the conclusiveness of title in the holder of a Torrens certificate and
the finality of a Torrens decree appeared to be entrenched firmly in
Minnesota law. However, this finality would disappear, the Minnesota
Supreme Court admonished, if application could be successfully
"addressed to [the court's] equitable powers" because such "will find
a limit only in the ingenuity of counsel in searching for and devising
methods of attack."9
The ability to attack successfully the Torrens decree has been re-
flected in three Minnesota cases interpreting the Torrens statutes. In
Konantz v. Stein,10 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a certifi-
cate of title may be subject to collateral attack where no actual notice
of the Torrens proceeding was afforded to a party in possession of a
portion of the parcel being registered. In Estate of Koester v. Hale," the
Minnesota court held that an erroneous inclusion of a tract of land in a
certificate could be corrected in a proper circumstance where neither the
registered owners nor their precedessors in title possessed or claimed any
right, title, or interest in the tract prior to the registration proceeding.
(1) Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or the constitution
of the United States, which this state cannot require to appear of record;
(2) The lien of any tax or special assessment for which the land has not been
sold at the date of the certificate of title;
(3) Any lease for a period not exceeding three years when there is actual occu-
pation of the premises thereunder;
(4) All rights in public highways upon the land;
(5) Such right of appeal, or right to appear and contest the application, as is
allowed by [chapter 508];
(6) The rights of any person in possession under deed or contract for deed from
the owner of the certificate of title.
Id.
Aside from the enumerated exceptions to the conclusivity of a Torrens decree listed in
the Torrens Act itself, "certain minor possibilities of incumbrance ... may exist in spite
of any certificate of title or decree of registration." 2 R. PATTON & C. PATTON, PATTON ON
LAND TrmEs § 686, at 630 (2d ed. 1957). These exceptions include situations where the
court of registration does not have jurisdiction over a party in possession at the time of
initial registration, where two certificates with respect to the same parcel have been
issued, where nonrecord rights exist of which the purchaser has actual knowledge, and
where nonrecord mechanic's liens exist during the period during which they are permitted
to exist without being recorded. See id. at 630-31. Additional exceptions are where the
court of registration lacked jurisdiction over the land, see Shevlin-Mathieu Lumber Co.
v. Fogarty, 130 Minn. 456, 153 N.W. 871 (1915), and where there was fraud, see Nitkey v.
S.T. McKnight Co., 87 F.2d 916 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 697 (1937). For a
discussion of these and other exceptions see R. PATRON & C. PATTON, REAL AcTIONS AND
PROCEEDINGS INCLUDING LAND TITLE REGISTRATION (MINNESOTA) 15-19 (1936).
9. Moore v. Henricksen, 282 Minn. 509, 520, 165 N.W.2d 209, 217 (1968) (quoting
Murphy v. Borgen, 148 Minn. 375, 377, 182 N.W. 449, 450 (1921)).
10. 283 Minn. 33, 167 N.W.2d 1 (1969).
11. 297 Minn. 387, 211 N.W.2d 778 (1973).
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More recently, in C.S. McCrossan, Inc. v. Builders Finance Co.," the
court held that an interest once memoralized but later omitted erro-
neously from a new certificate of title had priority over a mechanic's lien
which attached and was memorialized prior to the time the omission
was corrected.
Because of these developments, the legal profession must determine
whether it is now required to search behind the certificate of title to
solve questions of ownership. 3 In essence, the continued utility and
vitality of the Torrens system is at issue. What is now required to protect
a client dealing with registered land? Must records be maintained of
Torrens proceedings and obsolete certificates of title to enable a search,
as one would search through records for abstract property? This Note
will analyze these cases and will attempt to resolve some of the uncer-
tainties that they have created. The exceptions created by the court's
statutory interpretations will be discussed first. This discussion involves
an examination of the Koester and McCrossan cases. 4 Second, the due
process requirements in Torrens proceedings will be discussed. This
discussion involves an examination of the Konantz and Koester cases. 5
Finally, a theory will be proposed which will protect the conclusivity
and finality of a certificate holder's registered title, in an equitable
manner, consistent with the Konantz, Koester, and McCrossan cases.,'
II. THE RECENTLY CREATED EXCEPTIONS TO THE INDEFEASIBILITY OF
TORRENS TITLE ARISING OUT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-THE Koester
AND McCrossan CASES
In Estate of Koester v. Hale" and C.S. McCrossan, Inc. v. Builders
Finance Co., '8 the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted portions of the
Torrens Act and mechanic's lien statutes, respectively, to create excep-
tions to the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. While the cumulative effect
of numerous statutory and judicial exceptions may be detrimental to the
underlying purposes of the Torrens Act, these two exceptions by them-
selves do not raise serious problems. Both exceptions may be subject to
12. 304 Minn. 538, 232 N.W.2d 15 (1975).
13. While it may be necessary to examine the records and documents to ascertain the
full legal effect of an interest or encumbrance memorialized on the certificate of title, one
purchasing registered land in reliance upon the certificate of title should not be relegated
to searching the records for unmemorialized interests or encumbrances. See, e.g., Kane
v. State, 237 Minn. 261, 268-69, 55 N.W.2d 333, 337-38 (1952) (quoting In re Juran, 178
Minn. 55, 58, 226 N.W. 201, 202 (1929)); Horgan v. Sargent, 182 Minn. 100, 105-06, 233
N.W. 866, 869 (1930).
14. See notes 17-66 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 67-110 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 111-62 infra and accompanying text.
17. 297 Minn. 387, 211 N.W.2d 778 (1973).
18. 304 Minn. 538, 232 N.W.2d 15 (1975).
[Vol. 4
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significant limitations and can be harmonized with the Act's policy of
creating stable land titles.
A. The Koester Exception
In Koester, the subject of the litigation was the title to ten acres of
registered land lying between land owned by decedent Koester and de-
fendant Hale. In the original registration proceeding the description of
the ten acres, owned by Koester's predecessor in title, was erroneously
included by the defendant's predecessor in title in his application for
Torrens registration. The error continued through the registration pro-
ceeding because of the oversight of the registrant, his attorney, the
county examiner of titles, and the court of registration. Thus the final
decree for registration contained the same error. Koester's predecessor
in title had been named in the Torrens proceeding as an adjoining land-
owner for the purpose of fixing boundaries and was served only in that
limited capacity." He was not named or served as having or claiming
any right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the land. Subsequently, the
defendant purchased a portion of the registered property which adjoined
the ten-acre parcel and the certificate of title that she received erro-
neously included the description of the ten-acre tract.
Having no actual claim to the ten-acre tract, the defendant's conten-
tion that she was entitled to the property was based solely on the ration-
ale underlying the Torrens Act: conclusivity of title. 0 The trial court
rejected this argument, impressed a constructive trust upon the ten
acres, cancelled the defendant's certificate of title, and ordered the issu-
ance of a new certificate with the ten-acre tract deleted.
2
1
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against de-
fendant, stating that a claim based on the underlying purpose of the
Torrens Act, without more, had no merit.22 But the supreme court
found it unnecessary to impress a constructive trust on the ten-acre
parcel because relief could be afforded pursuant to a provision in the
Torrens Act. Specifically, the court held:
23
[Under the peculiar facts of this case, a purchaser of a specific tract
cannot enlarge the area of land purchased simply on the basis that the
19. While the method of service is not dependent upon the nature of a person's interest,
see MINN. STAT. § 508.15 (1976), a person may be named as having certain interests in
the application for registration. See id. § 508.06, as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch.
21, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 45. Notwithstanding the similarity in purposes, see note 82 infra,
a person may be named as an adjoining landowner for the purpose of registering the
boundary or as the fee owner of the adjacent land upon which the boundary may be fixed
for the purpose of registering the fee.
20. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
21. 297 Minn. at 389, 211 N.W.2d at 779.
22. Id. at 392-93, 211 N.W.2d at 781-82.
23. Id. at 393-94, 211 N.W.2d at 782.
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certificate of title erroneously includes adjoining lands. We hold, fur-
ther, that such error is subject to correction under § 508.71, subd. 2,
when it is found upon adequate evidence that the petitioner in the title
registration proceedings neither claimed nor could claim any right,
title, or interest in the erroneously included lands even though their
inclusion had occurred without intent to defraud.
In effect, the prior registration proceedings were held subject to collat-
eral attack.
The statutory provision used by the court to correct the certificate,
Minnesota Statutes § 508.71, subdivision 2,24 empowers a court to order
the entry of a new certificate or the entry or cancellation of a memorial
upon a certificate, or to grant any other just relief, where "an error or
omission was made in entering a certificate or any memorial thereon
. . . or upon any other reasonable ground." This statute further pro-
vides that the original decree for registration may not be opened and
that nothing should be done to impair the title or interest of a bona fide
purchaser holding a certificate, or his heirs or assigns, without their
written consent.n The court said this provision was intended to prevent
the unjust enrichment which would otherwise result if a purchaser was
allowed to retain title to an erroneously included tract merely because
the underlying purpose of the Torrens Act is conclusivity of title. Indeed,
none of the defendant's predecessors owned, claimed, or possessed the
disputed ten-acre parcel prior to registration; and when purchasing her
land, the defendant did not know the parcel would be included, did not
care if it was included, did not pay specifically for the parcel,"6 and did
not rely on the certificate of title as including itY Only after she learned
24. MINN. STAT. § 508.71(2) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
A registered owner or other person in interest may, at any time, apply by peti-
tion to the court, upon the ground ... that any error or omission was made in
entering a certificate or any memorial thereon ... or upon any other reasonable
ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all
parties in interest, and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or
cancellation of a memorial upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such
terms ... as it may consider proper; but the provisions of this section shall not
give the court authority to open the original decree of registration, and nothing
shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest
of a purchaser who holds a certificate for value and in good faith, or of his heirs
or assigns without his or their written consent.
Other grounds for relief exist. See note 33 infra. However, the court in its recitation of
the statute omitted these other grounds and only referred to the "error or omission" and
the "other reasonable ground" provisions. Thus, the statutory language quoted above is
the same language found by the court to be pertinent to the decision. See 297 Minn. at
392-93, 211 N.W.2d at 781.
25. MINN. STAT. § 508.71(2) (1976).
26. The value of the land which the defendant intended to purchase was appraised at
$8,000 and the value of the 10-acre tract was appraised at $10,000. However, the defendant
paid only $8,000 for the property purchased. 297 Minn. at 391-92, 211 N.W.2d at 781.
27. The record clearly showed that the defendant and her spouse were "under the
[Vol. 4
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of the erroneous inclusion did she claim the disputed tract.
Although these "peculiar facts" do support the equitable result of the
Koester decision, the court's reliance upon subdivision 2 of Minnesota
Statutes § 508.71 deserves comment. By relying on subdivision 2 the
court must have felt that either an "error or omission was made in
entering [the defendant's] certificate [of title] or any memorial there-
on, '28 or that a "reasonable ground" for relief existed.9
The error at issue in Koester was made at the beginning of the Torrens
proceeding and perpetuated throughout by several people: the regis-
trant, his attorney, the examiner of titles, and the court of registration. 3
The error was the inclusion of the disputed tract's description in the
application for registration, summons, decree for registration, and cer-
tificate of title. It was not an error made merely "in entering a certificate
or any memorial thereon," as these terms are used throughout the Tor-
rens Act. Other provisions of the Act make it clear that these terms refer
solely to the clerical or ministerial actions of the registrar of titles when
registering the certificate of title or embodying an interest, claim, or
encumbrance therein."' In Koester, the error was not a clerical or minis-
impression that they were merely purchasing a scenic knoll north of the disputed 10-acre
tract." The defendant testified that they "were 'unbelievably unconcerned about the
number of acres' and that they 'wanted the knoll, and that was it.' " Id. at 391, 211
N.W.2d at 781.
28. The court stated that "[tihis case represents no more than a correction of an error
admittedly committed during the registration proceedings." Id. at 393, 211 N.W.2d at 782
(emphasis added).
29. See note 24 supra.
30. See 297 Minn. at 389-91, 211 N.W.2d at 780.
31. For example, MINN. STAT. § 508.34 (1976) requires the registrar of titles to keep the
register of titles and "enter all first and subsequent certificates of title by binding or
entering them therein" in numerical order. This statute further provides that "Ithe
entering of the certificate of title in the register of titles shall constitute the act of registra-
tion." Id. Thus, the registrar's ministerial duty of placing the certificate of title in the
record books is referred to as "entering a certificate." Similarly, in MINN. STAT. § 508.37
(1976), the certificate of title is referred to as being entered in the register of titles, and
the registrar is directed to create indices with references to the volume and page in which
the certificates are so entered.
In cases of voluntary conveyance or nonconsensual transfer of title, MINN. STAT. § 508.45
(1976) provides that it is the registrar of titles who may be asked to "enter a new certifi-
cate"; but in the event the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented for cancellation
at the time of the request, "the registrar of titles shall not enter a new certificate, until
authorized so to do by order of the district court." This provision not only refers to the
registrar as the one who enters a new certificate, but makes it clear that the court does
not enter a certificate but orders the entry. Similarly, when a voluntary instrument is
presented with the owner's duplicate certificate, it is the registrar who is authorized to
enter a new certificate under MINN. STAT. § 508.51 (1976). Quite plainly, each of these
provisions strongly suggests that "entering a certificate" refers to the registrar's clerical
or ministerial duty associated with embodying a certificate of title in the register of titles,
which is the act of registration.
By analogy, "entering a memorial" refers to the registrar's ministerial actions connected
19781
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terial error made by the registrar in entering a certificate or memorial.
The registrar of titles properly embodied the court's decree in the certifi-
cate of title, and the registration proceeding itself cannot be considered
merely clerical. Thus, if the Koester court's decision was based upon the
statutory "error or omission" language, it gave the language a broader
meaning than it was given by the legislature elsewhere in the Torrens
Act.
The other alternative is that the court felt a "reasonable ground" for
relief existed. "Reasonable ground," as used in subdivision 2, is a gen-
eral term following the enumeration of six specific grounds for relief
which may be granted upon petition after a proper hearing.2 Each spe-
with embodying a memorial in the certificate of title. Pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 508.34
(1976), each certificate of title is to contain proper blanks for the entry of memorials and
notations, and the registrar of titles must enter each memorial or notation which he is
authorized to make upon the latest entered certificate of title. Thus, the registrar is among
those who may enter a memorial or notation, and it is entered on a certificate of title.
MINN. STAT. § 508.50 (1976) directs the registrar to endorse upon voluntary conveyancing
instruments received for registration address changes of grantees or those acquiring inter-
ests under the instruments; it also directs that all names and addresses must be entered
on the certificate of title, and it would seem to contemplate such entry by the registrar of
titles. In MINN. STAT. § 508.51 (1976), the registrar is authorized to make a memorial of
registration in accord with a voluntary conveyancing instrument when presented with the
owner's duplicate certificate. MINN. STAT. § 508.56 (1976) provides, with respect to a
mortgage upon which a mortgagee's duplicate has been issued, that a memorial of a
partial release shall be entered upon presentation of a proper instrument and the mortga-
gee's duplicate to the registrar of titles; it would seem the registrar of titles is to enter the
memorial. Under MINN. STAT. § 508.57 (1976), in the enforcement or foreclosure of a
mortgage or other charge upon real estate, notice of any suit or proceeding to do so must
be filed with the registrar and a memorial thereof must be entered. Logically, the registrar
would be the one to enter the memorial of the notice. Upon presentation of a certified copy
of a judgment or final decree which affects registered land, MINN. STAT. § 508.59 (1976)
commands the registrar of titles to "enter a memorial thereof upon the original certifiate
of title .... Similarly, upon filing a certified copy of a judgment requiring the payment
of money and a written statement containing a description of the land and the certificate
of title, MINN. STAT. § 508.63 (1976), as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21, § 7,
1977 Minn. Laws 48, provides "the registrar shall enter a memorial of such judgment upon
each certificate designated in such statement .... " Thus, "entering a memorial," as
used in the Torrens Act, must mean the registrar's clerical embodiment of memorials in
a certificate of title and his actions associated therewith.
32. See MINN. STAT. § 508.71(2) (1976). The enumerated grounds for relief contained
in subdivision 2 are:
that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expect-
ant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen
or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; or that any error or
omission was made in entering a certificate or any memorial thereon, or on any
duplicate certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been
changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married,
that the marriage has been terminated; or that a corporation which owned
registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three
years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground . . ..
[Vol. 4
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cific ground for relief deals with a change in circumstances, conditions,
errors, or omissions subsequent to the initial registration proceeding.1
3
Modification of the certificate in these situations is wholly consistent
with the underlying policy of indefeasibility and conclusivity.3 4 It is also
consistent with the statutory provisions against opening the original
decree for registration, 35 because the original decree for registration is
not attacked.
Applying the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction, 3 the ap-
parent meaning of the phrase "reasonable ground" would not include
grounds for relief dissimilar to the six specific grounds preceding it. It
would seem to cover only grounds for relief involving changes in condi-
tions, circumstances, errors, or omissions occurring subsequent to the
registration proceeding. This would not include the Koester-type error
which occurred before, but was continued throughout, the registration
proceeding.
By interpreting the statute to encompass the correction of an error
made in the application and perpetuated throughout the registration
process by the examiner of titles and the court of registration, the su-
preme court, in effect, opened the original registration proceeding and
allowed the plaintiff to prove a preexisting claim to a registered title.
Viewed in relation to the other provisions of the Torrens Act, the scope
of Minnesota Statutes § 508.71, subdivision 2, has apparently been ex-
panded.
33. None of the six specifically enumerated grounds for relief seems to authorize a
pancellation or alteration to reflect a circumstance, condition, or fact which existed before
the initial registration proceeding. The first ground refers to registered interests that "have
terminated or ceased." Id. A registered interest arises after the certificate or memorial is
entered in the register of titles. See id. § 508.34.
Thus, a registered interest that has "terminated or ceased" refers to an event which
takes place after the initial registration proceeding. The second ground permits the em-
bodiment of "new interests" which have arisen or been created but which do not appear
on the certificate, and thus implies that the interests arise or are created after the certifi-
cate is in existence. See id. § 508.71(2). The third ground refers to an "error or omission"
in entering a certificate or a memorial, which means an error or omission in embodying
the court's registration decree or other memorials in the register of titles. See notes 30-31
supra and accompanying text. The fourth ground permits alteration of a certificate to
reflect the change of the name of a person named thereon. See MINN. STAT. § 508.71(2)
(1976). The fifth ground refers to a subsequent change in marital status of the registered
owner. See id. The sixth ground refers to a dissolved corporate owner of registered land
which has not conveyed the land within three years of the dissolution. See id.
34. See notes 2 & 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
35. See MINN. STAT. §§ 508.22, .71(2) (1976).
36. See id. § 645.08(3) ("General words are construed to be restricted in their meaning
by preceding particular words .... ").
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B. The McCrossan Exception
In the 1975 case of C.S. McCrossan, Inc. v. Builders Finance Co., 7 the
Minnesota Supreme Court created another exception to the conclusivity
of a Torrens certificate. McCrossan completed improvements to real
property and received partial payment from the mortgagee, Builders
Finance. At the time, the mortgagee's interest was properly memorial-
ized on the certificate of title. Shortly thereafter the property was subdi-
vided into lots and separate certificates of title were issued for each lot.
By mistake the mortgagee's interest was omitted from the certificates
for seven of these lots. Subsequently McCrossan had its mechanic's lien
memorialized. Being listed first on these seven certificates, McCrossan
claimed priority over the mortgagee notwithstanding its prior actual
knowledge of the mortgagee's interest. The mortgagee argued that the
priority determinations should be made at the time the improvements
were commenced by McCrossan, or, in the alternative, that McCros-
san's prior knowledge of the mortgagee's interest prevented McCrossan
from relying on the certificate of title to establish its priority." Relying
on a statutory provision for mechanic's liens, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that priorities between mechanic's liens and mortgages were
to be determined at the time the mechanic's liens attached. In view of
the purposes underlying the Torrens system, the court stated:39
[Our] holding is therefore of strictly limited application. However,
upon the particular facts presented here, we hold that a mortgage pro-
perly registered and memorialized under the Torrens Act, the memori-
als of which the registrar neglected through error to carry forward onto
a subsequent certificate of title, retains its priority over the instant
mechanics lien, where said omission occurred subsequent to the fur-
nishing of the first and the last items of labor and materials by the
lienholder, who did not rely on the record title in furnishing such labor
and materials and who had actual knowledge of a financial interest of
the mortgagee prior to the date the omission occurred.
The error made in McCrossan was the registrar's failure to make a
proper entry upon the certificate, an error which seems clearly to be the
type encompassed by the statute relied upon in Koester:'" Minnesota
Statutes § 508.71, subdivision 2. However, the court in McCrossan did
not refer to it. Instead the court created another exception to the inde-
feasibility of Torrens certificates by interpreting the priority provisions
of the mechanic's lien statute.
In most cases, including those involving mortgages," the encum-
37. 304 Minn. 538, 232 N.W.2d 15 (1975).
38. Id. at 541, 232 N.W.2d at 17-18.
39. Id. at 544, 232 N.W.2d at 19.
40. See notes 24 & 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
41. See MINN. STAT. § 508.54 (1976).
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brance does not affect the registered title until the encumbrance is
memorialized. 2 However, a mechanic's lien attaches and takes effect
when "the first item of material or labor is furnished upon the premises
for the beginning of the improvements" 3 or, as against a bona fide
mortgagee such as Builders Finance," from the beginning of the first
visible improvement.4 5 The lienor then has a ninety-day grace period
within which to file the proper documents' with the registrar of titles
to preserve his lien.'" Thus, the mechanic's lien may affect the registered
title at a time prior to its memorialization.
Generally, the relative priorities of encumbrances on registered land
are determined by the order in which they are memorialized upon the
last certificate of title.'" But because a mechanic's lien may affect a
registered title from the time of its attachment and before memorializa-
tion, it seems logical that priority determinations with respect to it
should be made at the time of attachment. The mechanic's lien statute
seems to require such a result, and the court in McCrossan so held.'" The
mechanic's lien statute prescribes priority for a mechanic's lien over
"any mortgage or other encumbrance not . . . of record [at the time of
its attachment], unless the lienholder had actual notice thereof.",, The
mortgage of Builders Finance was of record when McCrossan's lien at-
tached, and therefore the question before the court was whether Build-
ers Finance lost its priority because its interest was not memorialized
on subsequent certificates until after McCrossan's interest had been
memorialized.
The court answered this question in the negative, holding that
McCrossan did not acquire priority because McCrossan furnished the
'first and last items of material and labor before the omission occurred,
it had actual knowledge of the mortgagee's interest prior to the date of
the omission, and it did not rely on the certificate of title in furnishing
42. See id. § 508.48.
43. Id. § 514.05.
44. The court neither discussed whether Builders Finance Company was a bona fide
mortgagee nor quoted from that portion of the mechanic's lien statute pertaining to bona
fide mortgagees. However, it appears that Builders Finance Company first properly regis-
tered its mortgage seven months before McCrossan acquired any materials and placed
them on the land, see 304 Minn. at 540, 232 N.W.2d at 17, so it could not have had notice
of any then existing lien of McCrossan. Therefore, Builders Finance Company would have
been a bona fide mortgagee. See Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279 Minn. 107, 116,
156 N.W.2d 247, 253 (1968); Carr-Cullen Co. v. Deming, 176 Minn. 1, 4, 222 N.W. 507,
508 (1928).
45. MINN. STAT. § 514.05 (1976).
46. See id. § 514.08(1).
47. See id. § 508.64.
48. Compare id. § 508.48 with id. § 507.34.
49. See 304 Minn. at 543-44, 232 N.W.2d at 19.
50. MINN. STAT. § 514.05 (1976).
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any of the materials and labor." The court's holding raises several note-
worthy points.
The first reason for its holding may be overly broad, except to the
extent it supports the second and third reasons of actual notice and lack
of reliance. According to the mechanic's lien statute, furnishing the first
items of material and labor is relevant to the priority determination, but
furnishing the last items is not.2 However, if the last items were fur-
nished and McCrossan received partial payment from the mortgagee
before the omission, McCrossan could not have relied on the certificate
of title when furnishing any of the items and would have had actual
knowledge of the mortgagee's interest before the omission occurred.
Although the mortgagee argued that McCrossan could not have relied
on the certificate of title because McCrossan had actual knowledge of
the mortgagee's interest before it furnished any materials and labor,53
the court apparently found a lack of reliance because actual knowledge
was acquired after work began but before McCrossan had its mechanic's
lien memorialized." Thus, allowing McCrossan to gain priority over a
known mortgagee by taking advantage of the registrar's error would
have been inequitable.
C. Reconciliation of Koester and McCrossan with the Torrens Act
Obviously aware that the absence of any successful limitation 5 on
51. 304 Minn. at 544, 232 N.W.2d at 19.
52. See MiNN. STAT. § 514.05 (1976).
53. 304 Minn. at 541, 232 N.W.2d at 17-18.
54. See id. at 544, 232 N.W.2d at 19. Indeed, if McCrossan had actual knowledge when
it commenced the improvements and its lien attached, it could not have acquired priority
over the mortgagee whether or not its interest was memorialized. See MINN. STAT. § 514.05
(1976); cf. Anderson v. Iverson Outdoor Life, Inc., 187 Minn. 308, 245 N.W. 365 (1932)
(abstract property). The court did not mention, however, whether McCrossan saw the
certificate of title or otherwise knew of the mortgagee's interest before the improvements
were commenced. Only after McCrossan had commenced the improvements and received
partial payment from the mortgagee could it be said with certainty that McCrossan had
actual knowledge. But this would not necessarily preclude its reliance upon the certificate
of title at the time the improvements were commenced.
Still, McCrossan could properly be charged with constructive notice of the properly
registered mortgagee's interest. See In re Juran, 178 Minn. 55, 60, 226 N.W. 201, 202 (1929)
(dictum). Compare MINN. STAT. § 508.48 (1976) with id. § 507.34. Without rising to the
level of actual knowledge, the constructive notice would have precluded McCrossan from
relying on the certificate of title at the time it acquired its interest.
55. Under the Torrens Act, any person in interest may petition the court for correction
of an "error ... in entering a certificate or. . . [a] memorial thereon" or for relief "upon
any other reasonable ground." MINN. STAT. § 508.71(2) (1976). Read broadly, the court's
interpretation of this provision in Koester would mean that any error made at any point
in a Torrens proceeding, which results in the erroneous inclusion of land in the final decree
and certificate of title, may be corrected at any time upon the petition of an interested
party. McCrossan, read broadly, would mean that a memorialized lien or encumbrance is
subordinate to an erroneously omitted and thus unmemorialized interest which, at some
[Vol. 4
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Koester and McCrossan would greatly diminish the utility of the Tor-
rens system,5 the Minnesota Supreme Court restricted its holding in
both cases. First, in both cases, the court reaffirmed that the underlying
purpose of the Torrens certificate is to create conclusive title in the
holder of the certificate and clearly indicated that the decisions were not
intended to destroy this purpose.57 Second, the court expressly limited
its holding to the "peculiar" 58 and "particular"5 facts presented. While
previous time, had been properly embodied in the certificate of title and which would have
had priority but for its erroneous omission.
Practical considerations require that these decisions not be read so broadly. For in-
stance, if Koester was interpreted so broadly, complete records of registration proceedings
would have to be kept readily available so that a prospective purchaser of registered land
and his attorney, hoping to avoid purchasing a title incorporating a Koester-type error,
could completely reconstruct the original registration proceeding. In addition, an abstract
examination would be needed to discern the identity of those who had interests in the
property at the time of the registration proceeding. Then the records of the proceeding
would have to be scrutinized for errors and deviations from the examiner's conclusions
based upon his examination of the abstract. The application, service, method of service,
and so forth would all have to be checked. The registration court's decree and its embodi-
ment in the certificate of title would also have to be examined for possible errors. Simi-
larly, McCrossan would require that all the obsolete certificates of title be kept for inspec-
tion by those individuals acquiring interests who wish to be certain nothing had been
omitted or not carried forward to the most recent certificate of title.
Such a state of affairs would make it difficult for the Minnesota practitioner to advise
his clients with respect to transactions involving registered land and also place undue
financial burdens on prospective purchasers desiring certainty of title. Essentially the
registration act would become another recording act. The Torrens proceeding itself would
be reduced to little more than an action to determine adverse claims. Murphy v. Borgen,
'148 Minn. 375, 377, 182 N.W. 449, 450 (1921). Moreover, the burdens would be heavier
than those associated with the recording act. Thus, apparently for these reasons, both the
Koester and McCrossan courts limited their holdings.
56. As early as 1902, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that, with the passing of
time, land had become subdivided into smaller and more numerous parcels and that the
number of landowners had correspondingly increased. See State ex rel. Douglas v. West-
fall, 85 Minn. 437, 440, 89 N.W. 175, 176 (1902). The Torrens system was created to reduce
and simplify the record keeping system and all its inherent uncertainties. If the holdings
of Koester and McCrossan were not limited, this purpose might be frustrated. See note
55 supra. In addition, the Torrens system was designed to increase the marketability of
titles and the value of real estate through increased certainty and the elimination of delay
and difficulty in transferring real estate. See Patton & Patton, Registration of Titles and
Conveyancying as Applied to Registered Titles, in 29 MINN. STAT. ANN. 435, 439-40 (1947).
These benefits would almost be lost completely if Koester and McCrossan were not lim-
ited. See note 55 supra.
57. See C.S. McCrossan, Inc. v. Builders Fin. Co., 304 Minn. 538, 544, 232 N.W.2d 15,
19 (1975) (in light of this purpose "[o]ur holding is therefore of strictly limited applica-
tion"); Estate of Koester v. Hale, 297 Minn. 387, 392, 211 N.W.2d 778, 781 (1973) (we
"reaffirm our declaration of ... [the] purposes [of the Torrens system] and our adher-
ence to the conclusiveness of a title to land registered pursuant to the Torrens system").
58. Estate of Koester v. Hale, 297 Minn. 387, 392-93, 211 N.W.2d 778, 781-82 (1973).
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the court in both instances was careful to state expressly the facts to
which its holdings were limited, 60 several facts were common to both
cases and one of these common facts can be used to reconcile both cases
with the purpose of the Torrens system.
In both cases, the losing parties' interests were acquired subsequent
to those of the prevailing parties." Furthermore, the decisions prevented
what would have otherwise been unjust enrichment. In Koester, while
the defendant was forced to give up the disputed ten acres, she did
retain the property she had paid for and had intended to purchase. If
she had been allowed to capitalize on the previously unnoticed error, she
would have been unjustly enriched." In McCrossan, the mechanic's
lienor could not have intended nor reasonably believed that its interest
would have priority at the time it began to furnish labor and materials,
because the mortgagee's interest was properly memorialized on the cer-
tificate of title." In addition, it gave nothing for its priority. Subordinat-
ing its mechanic's lien to the mortgagee's interest did not unjustly preju-
dice either party. But if the mechanic's lienor had been allowed to take
advantage of the registrar's error to gain priority over the known inter-
ests of the known mortgagee, it would have received a windfall.
The key factor in the Koester and McCrossan decisions-the factor
which harmonizes both cases with the underlying purposes of the Tor-
rens Act-is the lack of reliance on the certificate of title. In neither case
did the losing party rely on the erroneous certificate when purchasing
or acquiring an interest in the property." The defendants attempted to
rely on the strength of the Torrens title only after purchasing or acquir-
ing their interests. The reliance, thus, came too late because the purpose
of the Torrens system is to provide persons acquiring an interest in land
with the true state of title so that they can rely almost entirely on the
certificate at the time of the acquisition." Allowing persons to invoke
the underlying purpose of the Torrens system when they have, in fact,
not relied on the system would not promote more certain and confident
dealings in land or secure any of the benefits the Torrens system was
designed to provide.6 6 Therefore, the equitable results achieved in
60. See text accompanying notes 23 & 39 supra.
61. See C.S. McCrossan, Inc. v. Builders Fin. Co., 304 Minn. 538, 540, 232 N.W.2d 15,
17 (1975); Estate of Koester v. Hale, 297 Minn. 387, 389-91, 211 N.W.2d 778, 779-81 (1973).
62. See 297 Minn. at 393, 211 N.W.2d at 781-82.
63. See 304 Minn. at 541-42, 232 N.W.2d at 17-18.
64. See C.S. McCrossan, Inc. v. Builders Fin. Co., 304 Minn. 538, 541, 544, 232 N.W.2d
15, 17, 19 (1975); Estate of Koester v. Hale, 297 Minn. 387, 391, 211 N.W.2d 778, 781
(1973).
65. See, e.g., Kane v. State, 237 Minn. 261, 269, 55 N.W.2d 333, 338 (1952) (quoting In
re Juran, 178 Minn. 55, 58, 226 N.W. 201, 202 (1929)); Reed v. Siddall, 89 Minn. 417, 420,
95 N.W. 303, 303-04 (1903).
66. If a purchaser or encumbrancer does not rely on the certificate of title when acquir-
ing his interest, the stability added to the title by the Torrens system must be immaterial
[Vol. 4
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Koester and McCrossan, by recognizing interests in registered land
which were not memorialized on the certificate of title, have not under-
mined the purpose or the utility of the Torrens system in Minnesota.
However, the court's application of due process to the Torrens system
raises additional problems regarding conclusiveness of title.
I. THE DUE PROCESS ExCEPTION TO THE FINALrrY OF TORRENS
TITLE-THE Konantz AND Koester CASES
In Konantz v. Stein," the Minnesota Supreme Court held that notice
and an opportunity to be heard must be given to a person in possession
of real property before he can be divested of a property interest by a
Torrens registration proceeding. Konantz set the stage for what might
be interpreted as an even stronger due process attack on the finality of
a Torrens decree in Estate of Koester v. Hale.8
A. The Due Process Requirements of Konantz
In Konantz, a ninety-foot strip of land ran between real estate owned
by the plaintiffs and real estate owned by the defendant. The defendant
claimed title to the strip by virtue of a registration proceeding and
inclusion of the disputed parcel within the description found in the
resulting certificate of title. The plaintiffs claimed their title to the strip
had ripened by adverse possession and practical location of a boundary
line prior to the registration proceeding; they claimed their interest was
not extinguished because they had not been served with notice of the
registration proceeding.
The trial court held that the plaintiffs' rights were not extinguished
by the registration proceeding because the plaintiffs were in possession
at the time it was initiated, and were not served, and thus had no
opportunity to assert their claim of title in the registration proceeding."
The Minnesota Supreme Court held, inter alia, that if the plaintiffs had
to him. As such, he is not concerned with maximizing the value, the marketability, or the
transferability of the title to the land. And when nothing is paid for the specific rights
later claimed, there is no appreciable risk of loss which the certificate holder could hope
to minimize by acquiring a registered title instead of an ordinary unregistered title. Only
when a person relies on the Torrens system when he acquires a registered interest do his
expectations and the underlying policy of the Act coincide to require indefeasibility. Still,
this reasoning should not be applied without limitation. In some situations a certificate
holder's reliance must not be an absolute prerequisite to indefeasibility, such as when a
holder, who has relied on the Torrens system, seeks to transfer his interest to prospective
purchasers having knowledge of an adverse claim. See MINN. STAT. §§ 508.25, .71(2)
(1976). This eliminates the possibility that a grantee could acquire a lesser title than his
grantor-a possibility which would deprive the grantor of his property rights. See Moore
v. Henricksen, 282 Minn. 509, 519-20, 165 N.W.2d 209, 217-18 (1968).
67. 283 Minn. 33, 167 N.W.2d 1 (1969).
68. 297 Minn. 387, 211 N.W.2d 778 (1973).
69. 283 Minn. at 36, 167 N.W.2d at 4.
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acquired title by adverse possession prior to the registration proceeding,
were in actual possession when the proceeding was commenced, and had
no notice of the proceeding, due process would protect their property
rights from extinguishment by the registration proceeding. 0 Because the
right to due process was contingent upon having an interest in the prop-
erty, the court ordered a new trial to determine whether the plaintiffs
had acquired title by either adverse possession or practical location of
the boundary line prior to the time of the registration proceeding. If not,
they had no interest in the parcel because the registration proceeding
terminated the ability to acquire rights by adverse possession or pre-
scription.'
In so holding, the court stated that, under the facts of the case, pub-
lished notice was insufficient to satisfy due process. Pursuant to the
Torrens Act, a summons must be actually served upon the proper par-
ties, except that service by publication upon nonresidents and "persons
or parties unknown" is permitted.7" The court reconciled due process
requirements" with the statutory provisions granting finality and con-
clusivity to a decree upon all persons, whether they are mentioned by
name in the summons or are "unknown" claimants. In so doing, the
court followed prior Minnesota case law, 5 stating that the notice re-
quirement of the due process clause "cannot be fulfilled by a publication
of the summons when personal service or its equivalent can be easily
accomplished."76 Because the plaintiffs were known and presumably in
possession, only personal service would satisfy due process, and there-
fore the Torrens proceeding would not be effective and binding upon the
plaintiffs.
The court in Konantz further held that the two statutes of limitations
contained in the Torrens Act" did not bar the plaintiffs' action." The
70. Id. at 36, 47, 167 N.W.2d at 4, 10-11.
71. See MINN. STAT. § 508.02 (1976) ("No title to registered land in derogation of that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or by adverse possession.").
72. See id. § 508.16(1).
73. See 283 Minn. at 39, 167 N.W.2d at 6.
74. MINN. STAT. § 508.22 (1976). This provision provides in pertinent part:
Except as herein otherwise provided, every decree of registration shall bind the
land described therein, forever quiet the title thereto, and be forever binding and
conclusive upon all persons, whether mentioned by name in the summons, or
included in the phrase, "all other persons or parties unknown claiming any
right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the real estate described in the application
herein," . ...
75. Etzler v. Mondale, 266 Minn. 353, 123 N.W.2d 603 (1963) (proceedings to vacate
land); State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N.W. 175 (1902) (Torrens case).
76. 283 Minn. at 39, 167 N.W.2d at 6; accord, e.g., Sheperd v. Ware, 46 Minn. 174, 176-
78, 48 N.W. 773, 774-75 (1891); State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 620-21, 47 N.E. 551,
557 (1897).
77. The Act's two statutes of limitations are contained in MINN. STAT. § 508.26 (1976)
and id. § 508.28. The former provides in part:
Any person having any right, title, or interest in or lien upon the land upon
[Vol. 4
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court stated that a holding to the contrary would render these statutes
constitutionally invalid. While the legislature may enact statutes of
limitations, "it has no power to compel an owner in possession of real
estate to anticipate a dispute concerning his title and either institute
legal proceedings to prove his ownership or suffer the loss of his title."79
Furthermore, "[ain owner whose possession has not been contested to
his knowledge cannot reasonably be expected to bring suit against par-
ties unknown to protect his property from adverse claims of which he is
unaware."0
B. The Due Process Requirements of Koester
Konantz stands for the proposition that due process requires actual
notice and an opportunity to be heard as a condition to the termination
of interests owned by a person having both ripened nonrecord fee title
and actual possession. This proposition would attract few critics. A
second Minnesota case, Estate of Koester v. Hale,"' accepted the
Konantz decision and possibly refined it. Koester might even be read
as imposing a more stringent due process standard than Konantz.
In a Torrens proceeding, one may be served either as a person having
an interest in the parcel to be registered or as an adjoining landowner
whom the summons has not been actually served, and who had no notice or
knowledge of the filing of the application or of the pendency of such proceeding
prior to the entry of the decree therein, may at any time within 60 days after
the entry of such decree, and not afterwards, file his duly verified petition
setting forth such facts and praying for leave to file his answer therein. If the
court is satisfied of the truth of the matter set forth in such verified petition, it
shall make an order permitting such petitioner to answer the application.
The latter provides in part:
No decree of registration hereafter entered, and no original certificate of title
hereafter issued pursuant thereto, shall be adjudged invalid or set aside unless
the action in which the validity of such decree, or of the original certificate of
title issued pursuant thereto, is called in question, be commenced, or the defense
alleging the invalidity thereof be interposed, within six months from the date
of such decree. No action or proceeding for the recovery of any right, title,
interest, or estate in registered land adverse to the title established by any
original decree of registration hereafter entered shall be maintained, unless such
action is commenced within six months from the date of such original decree.
No action or proceeding for the enforcement or foreclosure of any lien or charge
upon or against registered land in existence at the date of any original decree of
registration hereafter entered, and which is not recognized and established by
such decree, shall be maintained, unless such action or proceeding is com-
menced within six months from the date of such original decree. No such action
or proceeding shall be commenced by any person who is bound by the decree.
78. 283 Minn. at 37, 167 N.W.2d at 4-5.
79. Id. at 44-45, 167 N.W.2d at 9.
80. Id. at 45, 167 N.W.2d at 9.
81. 297 Minn. 387, 211 N.W.2d 778 (1973).
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for the purpose of fixing boundary lines, or both. 2 In Koester, the dece-
dent's predecessor in title was served by the defendant's predecessor,
pursuant to a registration proceeding. The decedent's predecessor in
title was served as an adjoining landowner for the purpose of fixing
boundary lines;"3 he was not served as a person having an interest in the
parcel to be registered. Years later, the defendant claimed title to a ten-
acre parcel on the basis of the registration proceeding. The supreme
court affirmed a judgment against the defendant, stating that "such
limited and defective notice [as in Koester] should be afforded no
greater legal significance than the absence of any notice [as in
Konantz]." 4 Because Konantz was decided on due process grounds,
this statement, although dictum, could be interpreted as injecting due
process notions into the analysis even though the Koester court made
no express mention of any due process or constitutional basis for its
decision. On the other hand, the Koester discussion of the limited na-
ture of the notice given might be merely one of the peculiar facts which
82. Compare MINN. STAT. § 508.06 (1976), as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21,
§ 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 45 with MINN. STAT. § 508.15 (1976).
MINN. STAT. § 508.15 (1976) provides that the court shall order "all persons named in
the application" to be served. The application for registration must include and substan-
tially set forth the names of all persons who appear of record or are actually known to have
or claim any right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the land and the nature or character
thereof, id. § 508.06(5), as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws
45, the name and address of each occupant and the nature of the estate, interest, lien, or
charge the occupant or occupants have or claim, MINN. STAT. § 508.06(6), as amended by
Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 45; the name and address of any person
having or claiming 'any recorded or unrecorded lien or encumbrance and its nature,
amount, and, if recorded, its location in the records, MINN. STAT. § 508.06(7), as amended
by Act of April 12, 1977, ch: 21, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 45; and the names and addresses of
adjoining landowners if it is desired to fix and establish boundary lines, MINN. STAT. §
508.06(11), as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 45 (to be
renumbered as MINN. STAT. § 508.06(10)).
83. 297 Minn. at 390-91, 211 N.W.2d at 780. It does not appear that the court of
registration actually determined and established the boundaries. See id. at 391, 211
N.W.2d at 780. If the court of registration had established and fixed the boundaries of
the registrant's property as including the 10-acre tract, the decree might have been beyond
due process attack. Establishing boundaries always concerns fee title to the area of land
upon which the boundary may be fixed, at least until the quantity and configuration of
the disputed property becomes such that more than mere boundaries are being fixed.
Thus, if the disputed 10-acre parcel had been a narrow strip along a portion of the
perimeter of the registrant's land, the decedent's predecessor would have been personally
served with process for the proper and particular purpose. On the other hand, if the
disputed tract constituted an area of land such that fixing the boundaries to adjacent land
and registering the title thereto were not generally equivalent, the application would not
have "set forth substantially" the required elements. See MINN. STAT. § 508.06(5) (1976),
as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 45. The Torrens Act
would not have been complied with, and the court would not have had jurisdiction over
the property.
84. 297 Minn. at 394, 211 N.W.2d at 782.
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triggered the invocation of the statutory grounds actually relied upon in
the court's decision. 5 The apparent anomoly of the dictum in Koester
has received considerable discussion among members of the Minnesota
bar.86
This raises the question of whether or not traditional due process
notions require that the nature of the notice correspond to the effect of
the registration proceeding. The traditional due process requirements
upon which the indefeasibility of a certificate of title depends" would
not seem to dictate the result espoused by the Koester dictum. Koester
involved a claimant who had actual notice of the nature and pendency
of the proceeding; the decedent's predecessor in title had been person-
ally served with a summons" stating the name of the applicant, the
nature of the proceeding, a description of the property, and the relief
sought. 9 The notice failed, however, to describe every interest or every
manner in which the claimant's interest might be challenged. But com-
85. See id. at 393, 211 N.W.2d at 782. The court in Koester said:
We do not by this decision intend that registration of title should not be conclu-
sive against the holders of all claims who have been given due notice of the
proceeding, but rather hold that, under the peculiar facts of this case, a pur-
chaser of a specific tract cannot enlarge the area of land purchased simply on
the basis that the certificate of title erroneously includes adjoining lands.
Id. The court further held that the error could be corrected pursuant to MINN. STAT. §
508.71(2) (1976). See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
If a due process deficiency had been an independent basis for its decision, the court
would not have had to rely on MINN. STAT. § 508.71(2) (1976) for the power to correct the
certificate. The decree for registration and the certificate could not have barred the de-
fendant's rights. See Follette v. Pacific Light & Power Corp., 189 Cal. 193, 208 P. 295
(1922); Couey v. Talalah Estates Corp., 183 Ga. 442, 188 S.E. 822 (1936); Chicago Title
& Trust Co. v. Darley, 363 Ill. 197, 1 N.E.2d 846 (1936); Sheaff v. Spindler, 339 Ill. 540,
171 N.E. 632 (1930); 2 R. PATrON & C. PATTON, PARON ON LAND TITLES § 686 (2d ed. 1957).
86. Interview with Bruce W. Burton, Dean of William Mitchell College of Law, in St.
Paul, Minnesota (May 10, 1977).
87. Finality and indefeasibility depend upon the Torrens Act's provision on the conclu-
siveness of a decree, see note 74 supra and accompanying text, and the Act's two statutes
of limitations, see note 77 supra and accompanying text. These provisions could not
constitutionally place a burden upon anyone with vested rights to preserve affirmatively
those rights, see State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 445, 89 N.W. 175, 178
(1902); 2 R. PATrON & C. PATRON, PATrON ON LAND TrrLES § 686 (2d ed. 1957), unless the
burden is light when compared with the public interest. See Wichelman v. Messner, 250
Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) (constitutionality of the Marketable Title Act consid-
ered), noted in 71 A.L.R.2d 816 (1960). But where someone is properly served with a
summons and thereby properly notified that his rights are challenged by another, he may
justly be compelled to go forward and defend his claims or, after a reasonable period of
time, be barred forever from asserting his claims which are contrary to the resulting
judgment. See State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 445, 89 N.W. 175, 178
(1902). Thus, the constitutionality of the operation of the statutes of limitations depends
upon compliance with due process.
88. 297 Minn. at 391, 211 N.W.2d at 780.
89. See MINN. STAT. § 508.16 (1976).
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pliance with due process requirements cannot be determined by the
application of any exact standard in every case." Due process is a flexi-
ble standard which depends upon the surrounding practicalities of the
situation and the peculiarities of each case,9 as well as the nature of the
proceeding involved and the character of the rights to be affected.
In a Torrens proceeding, due process demands that everyone be af-
forded an opportunity to be heard on any claim inconsistent with those
being asserted. 3 To be meaningful, this requires notice of the pendency
of the proceeding." The notice given must be reasonably calculated to
inform the defendant of the proceeding,95 as if the applicant for registra-
90. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950);
Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 502-03, 236 N.E.2d 451, 457-58, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161,
171-72 (1968).
91. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950). Consti-
tutional law is not flawless in itself and does not demand perfection beyond the capabili-
ties of humans. See id. at 317; American Land Co. v Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 68-69 (1911). In
certain circumstances the due process clause is not offended by procedures which make
it possible that the purpose of due process will not be strictly complied with; due to
exigencies and impracticalities due process may even submit to notice provisions having
a high probability of futility, as is often found with forms of substituted service. See
American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 68-69 (1911); Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d
490, 502, 236 N.E.2d 451, 458, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161, 171 (1968). However, circumstances
prompt such concessions only when supported or supplemented by actual necessity, such
as occurs in Torrens proceedings. See Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150
Cal. 289, 308-11, 88 P. 356, 359-61 (1906); People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165,
175-76, 52 N.E. 910, 914 (1898); State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 620-21, 47 N.E. 551,
557 (1897); cf. Shepherd v. Ware, 46 Minn. 174, 177-79, 48 N.W. 773, 774-75 (1891) (action
to determine adverse claims).
92. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930). Actions in rem "bar indifferently all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established, and . . . any one in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of
alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest .... " Tyler v. Judges of the
Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405
(1900). Because a registration proceeding is local in character and concerned with adjudi-
cation of rights or interests in or title to real estate within the court's jurisdiction it is
substantially in rem. Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 46, 90 P. 129, 131 (1907); Title &
Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 309-11, 314-15, 88 P. 356, 360, 362
(1906); see Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76-77, 55 N.E. 812,
814-15, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900); State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn.
437, 444, 89 N.W. 175, 177-78 (1902). It is not like the quiet title action where only certain
persons are entitled to come forward and assert the validity of their claims. See Tyler v.
Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814, appeal dismissed,
179 U.S. 405 (1900).
93. See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 71 (1911) (citing Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908)). See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950) (general discussion of due process requirements in
context of the effect of an accounting on trust fund beneficiaries).
94. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956); see Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
394 (1914); Gill v. Gill, 277 Minn. 166, 171, 152 N.W.2d 309, 313 (1967).
95. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover
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tion actually was desirous of informing him, 9" as limited by all surround-.
ing circumstances. 7 However, the purpose of notice to the defendant is
not to inform him of all his possible claims or defenses." Its purpose is
to afford the defendant enough facts so that he may make a meaningful
choice of whether to defend, default, or acquiesce." Thus, the failure of
notice, which is otherwise proper, to enumerate in detail every possible
manner in which a claimant's rights will be challenged or every possible
theory which may be utilized therefore should not rise to the level of a
due process deficiency. Notice which puts the defendant upon an in-
quiry that will lead to all the facts of which he ought to be apprised,
when pursued with reasonable diligence and good faith, generally is
sufficient.'"0
In Koester, the decedent's predecessor in title was put in such a posi-
tion. The notice informed him of the nature and purpose of the registra-
tion proceeding as well as its significance with respect to all the land
described in the summons and application for registration. 1 He had
notice that his rights might be terminated and he should have realized
that they were in jeopardy because the notice indicated the general
remedy or relief sought and that the judicial power of the court had been
invoked.0 2 Although the notice was directed to him only in his capacity
as an adjoining landowner, his land was included in the description of
the land claimed by the applicant and one should be presumed to know
which land is his.' 3 If he had made reasonable inquiry, any misunder-
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940);
Gill v. Gill, 277 Minn. 166, 171, 152 N.W.2d 309, 313 (1967); Meadowbrook Manor, Inc.
v. City of St. Louis Park, 258 Minn. 266, 269, 104 N.W.2d 540, 542-43 (1960); Berkman v.
Weckerling, 247 Minn. 277, 282-83, 77 N.W.2d 291, 295 (1956); Dobkin v. Chapman, 21
N.Y.2d 490, 502-03, 236 N.E.2d 451, 457-58, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161, 171-72 (1968).
96. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
97. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219
U.S. 47, 68-69 (1911).
98. See Baldine v. Klee, 14 Ohio App. 2d 181, 183-85, 237 N.E.2d 905, 907-08 (1968).
99. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950);
Baldine v. Klee, 14 Ohio App. 2d 181, 183, 237 N.E.2d 905, 907 (1968).
100. Baldine v. Klee, 14 Ohio App. 2d 181, 237 N.E.2d 905 (1968). To put the defendant
in such a position he must be informed of the nature of the proceeding, its purpose, and
its significance. See Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 311-12,
88 P. 356, 361 (1906). He should have notice that someone is seeking to cut off the rights
he claims so that he may realize they are in jeopardy. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1956). The notice need only indicate the general remedy or relief
sought so that the defendant is able to recognize that the judicial power of the court has
been invoked and that if he does not appear and plead within the stated time his rights
will be barred. See Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 285 (1912); Title &
Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 312, 88 P. 356, 361 (1906).
101. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
102. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Riley v. Pearson, 120 Minn. 210, 220-21, 139 N.W. 361, 364-65 (1913) (quoting
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standing or lack of understanding would have been eliminated and he
should have realized the true state of affairs. Thus, it cannot reasonably
be said that the decedent's predecessor in title had no notice that his
rights in the ten-acre parcel were being put in issue.
There is an additional consideration, however: Konantz requires
actual service if such can be "easily accomplished.' ' 10 4 The question in
Koester thus becomes whether the decedent's predecessor could easily
have been served for the purpose of fee registration, rather than merely
as an adjoining landowner for the purpose of fixing boundaries. The
obvious answer is yes. If it was possible to identify the proper party to
be served for the registration of the boundary line, then arguably those
having an interest in the fee could also have been easily identified and
served. However, this answer raises tremendous problems for subse-
quent purchasers and title examiners. 0 5 The existence of a nonrecord
interest which has retained superiority over the registered title because
of a due process deprivation cannot even be discerned from the face of
the certificate of title.
Although apparently not adopted by the Koester court, there is an
alternative to the conclusion that the defendant could have been easily
served for the purpose of fee registration. One could conclude that the
decedent's predecessor in title could not easily have been named as a
claimant to the fee title of the disputed ten acres because his claim was
undiscovered despite the diligent efforts of several persons. The ten-acre
tract had been included in the land description by mistake in the first
place.0 6 The error had been made by two officers of the court of registra-
tion and the court itself,0 7 all of whom had independent duties to inves-
tigate and to prevent such errors. 00 One could suspect collusion between
the registration applicant and his attorney, especially because the same
attorney represented both claimants;'" but when the same error is also
made by the examiner of titles and the court of registration, it is logical
to infer that the error was not easily discoverable and that service in the
capacity as a fee owner, rather than an adjoining landowner, could not
and discussing American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911)).
104. 283 Minn. at 39, 167 N.W.2d at 6.
105. See note 55 supra.
106. 297 Minn. at 389, 211 N.W.2d at 780.
107. See id. at 389-90, 211 N.W.2d at 780.
108. It appears that the registrant's attorney made the application. See id. If so, he was
required to sign and verify the application. See MINN. STAT. § 508.05 (1976). It is most
likely the application was then referred to the examiner of titles, who had a duty to
investigate fully all facts pertaining to the title by examining the records, the application,
and the land itself for occupancy. See id. § 508.13. Finally, the court must determine the
status of the title, see id. §§ 508.10, .22, not being bound by the examiner's report, id. §
508.13.
109. 297 Minn. at 391, 211 N.W.2d at 780.
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have been "easily accomplished." And, although less than perfect serv-
ice was accomplished, the good faith, diligent efforts weigh in favor of
satisfying due process."10 Thus, under this analysis the interests of the
Koester-type plaintiff would be extinguished in the registration proceed-
ing without violation of the due process clause.
IV. A PROPOSED THEORY: COMBINING DUE PROCESS WITH THE COURT'S
STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS TO COMPENSATE EQUITABLY FOR Loss
The Konantz holding and the Koester dictum were based upon due
process deprivations,"' while the Koester and the McCrossan holdings
were based upon the registered owner's lack of reliance upon the certifi-
cate of title and the Torrens system."' These cases have created uncer-
tainties for the Minnesota real estate bar and members of the public
contemplating the registration of title to land or the acquisition of regis-
tered land, especially where nonpossessory, nonrecord interests may be
involved.'"
However, many of these uncertainties, as a practical matter, would
be mitigated substantially by the following proposal:
(I). When Due Process Was Satisfied.
If neither the person claiming adversely to the certificate of title, nor
any of his predecessors in title, was deprived of due process in the
original registration proceeding, his claim should be extinguished.
110. In registration proceedings, due process is satisfied when actual notice is given to
all known claimants as well as those who become known through the use of reasonable
diligence. See American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 64-67 (1911). Persons whose
identity could have been ascertained by a reasonable effort, who were not named in the
application, and who did not receive actual notice cannot be barred by the decree. See
Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 317, 88 P. 356, 363 (1906);
Sheaff v. Spindler, 339 Ill. 540, 554-55, 171 N.E. 632, 638 (1930); Tyler v. Judges of the
Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 78-79, 55 N.E. 812, 815, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S.
405 (1900). This places a burden upon the applicant in the registration proceeding. See
Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 318, 88 P. 356, 363 (1906).
Once he has, in good faith, discharged this duty, due process submits to necessity and
will permit the substituted service provided by the statute. See id. at 312-14, 88 P. at 361-
62; People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 176, 52 N.E. 910, 914 (1898); Tyler v.
Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 79, 55 N.E. 812, 815, appeal dismissed,
179 U.S. 405 (1900); Shepherd v. Ware, 46 Minn. 174, 177-79, 48 N.W. 773, 774-75 (1891);
State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 620-21, 47 N.E. 551, 557 (1897). However, this duty
may be discharged by a good faith diligent effort to comply with the statutory provisions,
see Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 79, 55 N.E. 812, 815, appeal
dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900); State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 443-44,
89 N.W. 175, 177-78 (1902); especially because "the provisions of the [Minnesota Tor-
rens] [Alct for serving the summons and giving notice of the pendency of the proceeding
are full and complete, and satisfy both the state and federal constitutions." Id. at 444, 89
N.W. at 178.
111. See notes 67-85 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
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(II). When Due Process Was Not Satisfied.
If either the person claiming adversely to the certificate of title, or any
of his predecessors in title, was deprived of due process in the original
registration proceeding, the adverse claimant should be able to assert
his claim in a judicial proceeding, thereby curing the due process de-
fect.
(A). If the adverse claimant was in possession of the real estate or
had accessible notice of his otherwise nonrecord claim on file with
the registrar of titles at the time the registered owner acquired his
registered interest, the adverse claimant should be able to proceed
and prove his claims against the real estate.
(B). If the adverse claimant was not in possession of the real estate
and had not filed an accessible notice of his otherwise nonrecord
claim with the registrar of titles at the time the registered owner
acquired his registered interest, a presumption of reliance upon the
Torrens system and certificate of title, in favor of the registered
owner, should be recognized.
(1). If the adverse claimant can overcome the presump-
tion and show that the registered owner did not rely on the
Torrens system and certificate of title at the time he ac-
quired the registered interest, the adverse claimant should
be allowed to proceed and prove his claims against the real
estate.
(2). If the presumption cannot be overcome by the ad-
verse claimant, he should not be allowed to assert his
claims against the real estate; he should be relegated to
asserting his claims against the Torrens assurance fund.
The validity of clause (I) should have no critics; a person can be de-
prived of a property interest if due process has been satisfied. Further-
more, if the nonrecord adverse claimant is not in possession and has not
done anything to notify the world of his claim at the time of the registra-
tion proceeding, due process is not violated by a failure to serve him
personally with notice of the registration proceeding and he cannot sub-
sequently prevail."' The substituted service"5 provided by the Torrens
Act should be sufficient to bind him in most instances. Only when the
nonrecord adverse claimant or his predecessor in interest did something
to notify the world of his claim do the Konantz holding and the Koester
dictum require more than substituted service. If this requirement is not
met, the proposed theory recognizes the initial due process defect and
attempts to give the adverse claimant his opportunity to be heard at a
subsequent time.
114. In this instance, except where the registrant otherwise had actual knowledge of the
claimant and his claim, the claimant would be unknown and the substituted service by
publication provided by MINN. STAT. § 508.16 (1976) would be sufficient. See Dean v. Rees,
208 Minn. 38, 292 N.W. 765 (1940); Doyle v. Wagner, 108 Minn. 443, 122 N.W. 316 (1909).
115. See MINN. STAT. § 508.16 (1976).
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Under clause (II) of the proposed theory, this original due process
defect would be cured by subsequently giving the adverse claimant an
opportunity to be heard"' and an appropriate remedy. A consideration
in determining the remedy would be the registered owner's reliance
upon the certificate and upon the Torrens system in general. Because
there is a tremendous public interest in the general indefeasibility of
Torrens titles, the registered owner who relied upon the certificate
should be allowed to retain the property and the adverse claimant
should be given a remedy other than a claim to the property. If, however,
the registered owner did not rely upon the certificate or the Torrens
system in general, Koester and Konantz apparently manifest a policy
determination that the denial of due process should be remedied by
allowing the adverse claimant to proceed against the land itself. The
proposed theory recognizes this distinction based on reliance, and sets
forth different remedies based on indicia of the registered owner's reli-
ance: the adverse claimant's possession and filing of notice.
A. Remedying the Denial of Due Process when the Adverse Claimant
was in Possession or had Notice of His Interest Filed at the Time the
Registered Owner Acquired His Registered Interest
If the registered owner acquires his registered interest when the claim-
ant is in possession of the land or has filed a notice of his adverse claim
with the registrar of titles, the Koester dictum, Konantz, and
McCrossan should be followed: the person claiming adversely to the
certificate should be able to proceed against the property. His possession
or filed notice will notify everyone of his adverse claim and preclude
reliance upon the Torrens system by subsequent registered owners hop-
ing to bar his claim. Thus, the adverse claimant could either continue
in possession in the normal course of events or, if he wished, vacate and
file a notice of his claim without losing his interest in the property.
Under these circumstances a prospective purchaser could easily locate
the Konantz- and Koester-type defects. He would, of course, need to
check for possession or a record claim. This duty offends the basic con-
cept of an indefeasible Torrens title, but in view of Konantz and Koester
it is apparently the only way of assuring that an adverse claimant de-
prived of due process during the registration proceeding will not be
entitled to proceed against the property.
If the person claiming adversely to the registered title was in posses-
sion or filed a notice of his claim and thus was allowed to assert his claim
against the property, the registered owner might suffer a loss. If the
registered owner suffers a loss, arguably he should recover from the
assurance fund. 17 There is a better argument, however, that the regis-
116. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
117. MINN. STAT. §§ 508.75-.79 (1976).
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tered owner's failure to discover the claimant's possession or notice of
claim should constitute negligence and thus bar his recovery from the
assurance fund. "' If the registered owner is the registrant, he would have
been required to "set forth substantially""' in the application for regis-
tration certain facts, including whether or not the land was occupied
and the nature of the interest of any occupant.2 0 Analogously, if the
registered owner is a subsequent purchaser, he could be held negligent
for not checking for occupancy or notice of a nonoccupying claimant's
interest.' Denial of recovery from the assurance fund would usually
impose no hardship on the Konantz- and Koester-type registered owners
who paid nothing for the erroneously included land;'2 in fact, paying
them money damages out of the assurance fund would constitute unjust
enrichment.'2 3 In the rare situation when the registered owner suffers
actual loss, 4 recovery could be allowed based on his warranties of title.
B. Remedying the Denial of Due Process when the Adverse Claimant
was Neither in Possession Nor had Notice of His Interest Filed at the
Time the Registered Owner Acquired His Registered Interest
If the adverse claimant is not in possession and has not filed a notice
of his claim with the registrar of titles prior to the time when the regis-
tered owner acquires his registered interest, neither the Koester dictum,
Konantz, nor McCrossan would appear to apply and therefore it is argu-
able that the denial of due process can be remedied by a means other
than entitlement to the property. When there is neither possession nor
a filing of notice by the adverse claimant, a presumption that the regis-
118. See id. § 508.76.
119. Id. § 508.06, as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws
45.
120. MINN. STAT. § 508.06, as amended by Act of April 12, 1977, ch. 21, § 3, 1977 Minn.
Laws 45.
121. Cf. Meulners v. Hawkes, 299 Minn. 76, 80, 216 N.W.2d 633, 635 (1974) ("contrib-
utory negligence rests upon plaintiff's failure to exercise the care of a reasonable man
for his own protection"); Bridges v. Hillman, 249 Minn. 451, 454, 82 N.W.2d 615, 617
(1957) (contributory negligence exists when "plaintiff [does] not exercise that degree of
care under the circumstances which a rational person would exercise for his own safety").
122. Neither defendant Hale, see 297 Minn. at 391-92, 211 N.W.2d at 781, nor defen-
dant Stein, see 283 Minn. at 36-37, 167 N.W.2d at 4, paid for the interest in the real estate
they later claimed solely on the strength of the Torrens certificate.
123. 297 Minn. at 393, 211 N.W.2d at 781-82.
124. It seems unlikely that a registered owner would pay for his registered interest when
the person asserting the adverse interest was either in possession or had notice of his claim
on file. Rarely would anyone wish to acquire a lawsuit along with his property interest.
Thus, it is likely the registered owner would be unaware that he was acquiring the con-
tested additional interest and therefore would not pay for it. Only where he would be so
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tered owner relied on the certificate of title and upon the Torrens system
should be recognized, and if not rebutted, the adverse claimant should
not be entitled to proceed against the property. When the claimant of a
nonrecord interest was not in possession and had not filed notice of his
claim, it is reasonable to presume the registered owner acquired his
registered interest relying on it and the Torrens system.' Public pol-
icy, '2 the Torrrens Act, 27 and even the Konantz, Koester, and
McCrossan cases support the proposition that such a registered owner
should not usually be disseized. 25 This presumption would add to the
stability of registered land titles and the utility of the Torrens system
by assisting those relying on the Torrens system and certificate of title.
The strength of the presumption and the manner of its implementa-
tion will determine its effectiveness. Use of a conclusive or irrebuttable
presumption would completely bar an adverse claimant from proceeding
against the property but would be more likely to produce unfair re-
suits. 29 For example, a registered owner might acquire his registered
interest with actual knowledge of the claimant's nonpossessory, nonre-
cord interest. Placing the property absolutely beyond reach of the claim-
ant would put form before substance, something which the Koester
court expressly rejected. 30 On the other hand, use of a rebuttable pre-
125. When there is no easy way to check for the unrecorded nonpossessory interest, it
is reasonable to presume the registered owner did not have knowledge of it and relied upon
the Torrens system and certificate of title in making his acquisition. This rational relation-
ship between the facts required to be proved-no occupancy or notice on file at the time
of the acquisition-and the fact to be presumed-reliance-is necessary for the presump-
tion to be constitutionally valid. Cf. Mobile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35,
43 (1910) (negligent operation of locomotive presumed from certain train accidents). See
generally Developments in the Law-Evidence, 46 H~Av. L. REV. 1138, 1145-47 (1933). The
presumption could be based upon either the probability of reliance in such a circum-
stance, or upon social policy favoring indefeasibility. See generally Thompson,
Presumptions and the New Rules of Evidence in Minnesota, 2 WM. MrrCHELL. L. REv. 167,
182-83 (1976).
126. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 8, 24, 74 & 77 supra.
128. In each case the registered owner registered his interest or acquired his registered
interest with knowledge of the claimants' adverse rights. Thus, they could not have rea-
sonably relied on the certificate of title as reflecting the true state of the title. See C.S.
McCrossan, Inc. v. Builders Fin. Co., 304 Minn. 538, 540, 232 N.W.2d 15, 17 (1975); Estate
of Koester v. Hale, 297 Minn. 387, 389-90, 211 N.W.2d 778, 780 (1973); Konantz v. Stein,
283 Minn. 33, 41-42, 167 N.W.2d 1, 7-8 (1969). The McCrossan holding, see note 59 supra
and accompanying text, and the Koester holding, see note 58 supra and accompanying
text, were limited to their respective facts. See also notes 64-66 supra and accompanying
text.
129. Furthermore, irrebuttable presumptions have almost uniformly been declared un-
constitutional as denying due process. State v. Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 250, 15 N.W.2d 554,
557 (1944), noted in 162 A.L.R. 477 (1946).
130. 297 Minn. at 393, 211 N.W.2d at 782. Such an approach would place form over
substance by placing the structure of the circumstances surrounding the transaction over
the actual reliance or nonreliance of the certificate holder.
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sumption which would have to be overcome by an adverse claimant as
an element of his standing to sue would produce the desired result,
especially if coupled with a substantial burden of proof and something
analogous to the shelter provision of a bona fide purchaser rule. 3' Fur-
thermore, the registered owner could avoid the burden of full-scale liti-
gation with pretrial' and summary judgment motions 3 ' in the appro-
priate circumstance. In any event, the creation of the presumption will
not bar or impede the assertion of a claimant's constitutional rights; 34
it will only affect the relief or remedy granted. The claimant who is
unable to overcome the presumption would be required to resort to an
alternative remedy: the Torrens assurance fund.
The Torrens assurance fund was originally established to protect pri-
vate parties from mistakes made by government officials during regis-
tration proceedings.'1 Whether an adverse claimant deprived of due
process could and should be allowed to proceed against the Torrens
assurance fund depends on the answers to three questions. The first is
whether the claimant can satisfy the statutory requirements for recover-
ing from the fund. The second is whether the statute of limitations on
recovery from the fund could operate to bar recovery. The third is
whether money damages rather than the property itself is adequate
relief.
1. The Statutory Requirements for Recovery from the Assurance Fund
Generally, to receive the benefits of the fund, a claimant must show
(1) that he sustained loss by reason of an "omission, mistake or misfeas-
ance" of the registrar of titles, the examiner, or a clerk of court; (2) that
131. Once a person in a chain of title registers the title or purchases a registered title
in reliance on the Torrens system or certificate, those who subsequently acquire title from
or through this person should be protected as if they purchased in reliance upon the
certificate. Cf. Aldrich v. Wilson, 265 Minn. 150, 159, 120 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1963) (plaintiff
entitled to same protection as his grantor in boundary line dispute). Otherwise, the holder
of a certificate may have a title which is less secure than that formerly held by his grantor.
See Moore v. Henricksen, 282 Minn. 509, 519, 165 N.W.2d 209, 217 (1968). Of course, as
with the shelter provision of other bona fide purchaser rules, one who formerly held an
interest under circumstances not entitling him to the benefits accorded a bona fide pur-
chaser should not be allowed to obtain these benefits by reacquiring an interest from an
intervening protected party. See, e.g., Independent Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 274
U.S. 640, 648 (1927); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 1362, 1372-75 (1929); cf. MINN. STAT. § 336.3-201(1)
(1976) (rights of transferee of a negotiable instrument).
132. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 12.
133. See id. 56.
134. If the presumption effectively denied the claimant an opportunity to be heard, it
would be invalid. See note 129 supra; cf. Mobile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S.
35, 43 (1910) (legislatively created presumption); Juster Bros. Inc. v. Christgau, 214 Minn.
108, 118, 7 N.W.2d 501, 507 (1943) (discussing conclusive presumptions created by the
legislature).
135. See MINN. STAT. § 508.75 (1976).
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the loss was "without negligence on [the claimant's] part"; and (3)
that he is precluded "by the provisions of this law" from bringing an
action to recover the interest lost.
3 6
Persons who were denied due process in the registration proceeding
will probably be able to satisfy the first requirement in most instances.
Usually, such persons will have been deprived of due process because
they were in possession or had their claim on public record but were not
served personally.3 7 During registration proceedings, the title examiner
is required by the Act to ascertain the rights of persons in possession and
the rights of persons having their interest filed on public records to
enable such persons to be served.' 3 If personal service on such persons
fails because of the examiner's failure to perform this duty or because
of some other act or omission of the registrar or clerk, it is relatively clear
that this will constitute the type of "omission, mistake or misfeasance"
which is compensable by the assurance fund.
The requirement of nonnegligence would normally be met by a party
originally deprived of due process. Of course he cannot shut his eyes to
the obvious, but if he does not receive notice of the proceeding and its
possible effect on his rights he should not be considered negligent.
Compliance with the requirement that the claimant be precluded "by
the provisions of this law" from bringing an action to recover the interest
lost 139 raises a difficult legal issue. In most cases, the Act's statute of
limitations precludes an action for recovery of the land if it is not
brought within six months from the date of registration. 40 However,
where the claimant was deprived of his property without due process of
law,"' Konantz holds that the statutes of limitations are inoperative."'
Thus, the claimant would not be "precluded" from bringing his action
to recover the land and he could not recover from the assurance fund.
The view could be taken, however, that the claimant need only be
barred from bringing the other action "by the provisions of this law,"
' 3
that is, by the words of the statutes themselves. If stripped of the consti-
tutional interpretation given to the statutes of limitations by the court
in Konantz, the literal words of the statutes preclude recovery against
the land. Certainly the legislature did not anticipate the Konantz con-
struction of the Act, and this interpretation would be consistent with the
136. See id. § 508.76.
137. In most instances a person not in possession or not having a claim on public record
will have received due process from the substituted service by publication required under
MINN. STAT. § 508.16(1) (1976). See notes 110 & 114 supra.
138. See MINN. STAT. § 508.13 (1976).
139. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
140. See MINN. STAT. § 508.28 (1976).
141. See text at 82 supra.
142. See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
143. See MINN. STAT. § 508.76 (1976).
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Act's purpose of allowing recovery from the fund by those persons who
would have been injured by an omission made during a registration
proceeding. " '
2. The Statute of Limitations on Actions Against the Fund
Even if the court construes the assurance fund threshold provisions
to allow recovery by a claimant denied due process, the six-year statute
of limitations provision relating to recovery from the fund"' might bar
recovery in many cases. The statute begins to run "from the time when
the right to commence the [action] accrued." If this provision is con-
strued to mean from the time of the omission, claimants who were
denied due notice of the original proceedings would often have little
time within which to discover the existence of their claims against the
fund. The very nature of the omission would make the loss of their
interest extremely hard to discover." 6 This construction of the statute
follows, however, the general rule that lack of knowledge of a claim does
not toll a statute of limitations."17 However, an alternative construction
that "accrued" means the time from which the claimant discovered or,
in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered his claim, could
be employed. Although the "time of discovery" rule has been generally
rejected in Minnesota," 8 the court left open the issue of adopting the
rule in at least one instance"' and the rule has been adopted in some
jurisdictions.. 0
144. See id.
145. See id. § 508.79.
146. If the interest was not discovered during the original registration proceeding, ab-
sent a subsequent change in circumstances, it is reasonable to assume discovery of the
interest would remain difficult. See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text; note 108
supra. Furthermore, the holder of the interest would have no reason to discover the loss
until, possibly, a title search is made for one reason or another, because he would not have
any knowledge of the registration proceeding.
147. See, e.g., Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 449, 234 NW.2d 775, 794 (1975) (per
curiam) (defamation), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902 (1976); Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280
Minn. 147, 153, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968) (negligence); Voegele v. Mahoney, 237 Minn.
43, 48-49, 54 N.W.2d 15, 18-19 (1952) (adverse possession).
148. See, e.g., Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 449, 234 N.W.2d 775, 794 (1975) (per
curiam) (defamation), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902 (1976); Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280
Minn. 147, 153, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968) (negligence); Sollar v. Oliver Iron Mining Co.,
237 Minn. 170, 175-76, 54 N.W.2d 114, 117-18 (1952) (mutual mistake); Voegele v. Maho-
ney, 237 Minn. 43, 48-49, 54 N.W.2d 15, 18-19 (1952) (adverse possession).
149. Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 449 n.21, 234 N.W.2d 775, 794 n.21 (1975) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902 (1976).
150. See, e.g., Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 776, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (1954) (medical
malpractice); Stoneham Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Johnson, 295 Mass. 390, 395-96, 3
N.E.2d 730, 732 (1936) (clerical mistake in mortgage description); Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431-34, 248 N.E.2d 871, 874-75, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 28-29
(1969) (medical malpractice); Lewey v. H.C. Fricke Coke Co., 166 Pa. 536, 548, 31 A. 261,
264 (1895) (trespass via underground mining from adjacent property).
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It is submitted that the "time of discovery" rule should be applied to
the assurance fund statute of limitations. The main purpose of any
statute of limitations is to eliminate the assertion of stale claims '5 ' and
thereby help prevent the introduction of fraudulently constructed evi-
dence.15 2 Thus the Minnesota court's rejection of the "time of discovery"
rule in medical malpractice cases5 ' makes sense because of the complex
evidence which might become stale over a period of years.' This is not
the case where one having an interest in the property at the time of the
registration proceeding is not served and thereafter loses his interest by
virtue of the proceeding. The main factual issues to be resolved in an
assurance fund case are the omission of the interest by the examiner and
the nonnegligence of the claimant. The omission by the examiner can
be proven by simply going to the registration file and determining
whether the examiner noted the interest. The nonnegligence of a claim-
ant might be shown simply by the fact that he was not given notice of
the proceeding. Thus, there is only an insignificant danger of stale
claims or fraudulent evidence.
3. The Adequacy of Money Damages
When implementing this proposed theory the court will be required
to conclude that granting a wronged claimant money damages, instead
of returning his real estate, is adequate. Although restoring a wronged
party's land to him is appealing in light of the traditional view that all
land is unique,' 5 the uniqueness principal should not be allowed tc
frustrate the purpose of the Torrens system with its overriding purpose
of establishing stable land titles. In addition, land is increasingly viewed
as a fungible commodity.' Where uniqueness and title stability clash,
151. See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
152. See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 107, 83 N.W.2d 800, 816-17 (1957) ("It
would encourage fraud, oppression, and interminable litigation, to permit a party to delay
a contest until it is probable that papers may be lost, facts forgotten, or witnesses dead.")
(quoting Baker v. Kelly, 11 Minn. 480, 493 (Gil. 358, 371) (1866)), noted in 71 A.L.R.2d
861 (1960); Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694, 697
(1937).
153. E.g., Johnson v. Winthrop Lab., 291 Minn. 145, 148-49, 190 N.W.2d 77, 80 (1971).
154. See 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 536, 539-41 (1973); 59 Ky. L.J. 990, 993-94 (1971); 18
N.Y.L.F. 491, 496-97 (1972).
155. From the time the common law first began to develop in England, land has been
a very special and basic form of wealth. Whether fertile, barren, or devoid of any special
characteristic, land has traditionally been treated as unique. See 5A A. CORBiN, CONTRAcTS
§ 1143, at 126 (1964); 8A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 4479, at 457 (1963).
156. Government largess is constantly eroding the position of importance formerly occu-
pied by the traditional forms of wealth. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964). As it does, the traditional forms of wealth, including real estate, become less
important and they will probably continue to receive less of the special treatment which
was originally afforded them. See, e.g., Line, Implied Warranties of Habitability and
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the Minnesota Legislature long ago viewed land as fungible, as evi-
denced by the very existence of the assurance fund.
The Konantz holding and the Koester dictum indicate that the
wronged party is to receive his property interest back after he has
proved his right thereto. '57 But returning the property interest to the
wronged party was a judicially created remedy'8 which can be judi-
cially changed.' 9 By doing so the court would be enhancing the legis-
lative policy of allowing disseized persons to recover from the assurance
fund rather than from a registered owner who relied on the strength of
the Torrens system. Furthermore, the relief suggested by the Konantz
holding and the Koester dictum does not appear to be constitutionally
required. The United States and the Minnesota Constitutions merely
require that a person not be deprived of his property without due pro-
cess of law,'60 and that there be a "certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or
character."' 6 ' This merely requires a proper and adequate remedy,
which, it would appear, is given by money damages.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in the McCrossan,
Koester, and Konantz cases have injected some uncertainty into the in-
defeasibility of Torrens property. McCrossan is probably the least
troublesome because it involved a situation where the party attempting
to assert the indefeasibility of the Torrens certificate had actual know-
Fitness for Intended Use in Urban Residential Leases, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 161 (1974);
Comment, Torts-Abolition of the Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees Entitles
All Visitors to a Standard of Reasonable Care- Mounsey v. Ellard, __ Mass. -, 297
N..E.2d 43 (1973), 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 795 (1974); Note, Real Property-Implied War-
ranty of Habitability in North Carolina, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 155 (1975) (sales of new
homes by builder-vendors); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968) (recent tendency to require
landlord to mitigate damages caused by abandoning tenant).
157. See notes 70 & 84 supra and accompanying text.
158. See Dewey v. Kimball, 89 Minn. 454, 95 N.W. 317, aff'd on rehearing, 89 Minn.
463, 96 N.W. 704 (1903).
159. See, e.g., Nieting v. Blondell, - Minn .... 235 N.W.2d 597, 600-01
(1975) (abolishing the judicially created tort immunity for the state of Minnesota).
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
161. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
162. Legislative substitutions or alterations of remedies are permissible if they satisfy
the due process requirement of affording a substantial and efficient remedy. See Hardware
Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 159 (1931) (citing Crane v. Hahlo,
258 U.S. 142, 147 (1922)); Ray v. Rambaud, 103 Ariz. 186, 188, 438 P.2d 752, 754 (1968).
Similarly, MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8 only requires that an adequate remedy remain after a
legislative substitution or alteration. See Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 435, 35
N.W.2d 719, 735 (1949) (quoting Allen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 122-23, 41 N.W.
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ledge of the adverse claimant's rights. More troublesome are the
Koester and the Konantz decisions because they indicate that undis-
covered claims to Torrens property, existing at the time of registra-
tion, can later be asserted to disseize the registered owner of his Torrens
property.
This ability to disseize property from a registered owner stems from
the due process clause. In recognition of both due process requirements
and the policy of having indefeasible Torrens property, this Note has
proposed a theory which corrects the due process defects and, at the
same time, gives the greatest protection possible to persons relying upon
the Torrens system.
The theory does not attempt to dictate any particular result for every
possible circumstance because that, necessarily, must depend upon the
resolution of factual issues. It only seeks to determine whether the
claimant, if successful, will have his claims statisfied with the real es-
tate or out of the assurance fund. In doing so the theory incorporates the
extent of reliance by the registered owner upon the Torrens system. This
reliance is measured, in part, by the adverse claimant's possession or
record notice of his interest at the time the registered owner acquired a
registered interest in the Torrens property. It also assists registered own-
ers, those contemplating acquisition of registered title, and title examin-
ers by placing greater emphasis on, or redirecting some of the emphasis
towards, things easily discernible at the time the registered interest is
acquired. Implementation of the proposed theory is not beyond the
power of the supreme court; but because the theory involves many broad
policy determinations, legislative action should be taken.
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